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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IIO\\' AitD B. ERIC KSEX, 
Plain tiff -Appellant J 
vs. 
HOBER'I' L. POULSEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
9973 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATE~IENT OF l{IND OF CASE 
This is an action wherein plaintiff has ~sked for 
damages due to the sale of a P.O.A. stallion named 
Applejack, alleging that defendant warranted said 
stallion to be fit and capable of producing offspring 
by reason of past performance; alleging that the stal-
lion was sterile; that as a result of sterility certain 
expenses were incurred. In his prayer he prayed for 
rescission as well as damages. Defendant answers and 
alleges that said stallion was young and of tender age; 
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that two mares had been bred prior to the time of sale 
and were with foal; that if the stallion became sterile 
it was due to negligence and mismanagement of the 
plaintiff, or sickness or disease contracted on the prem-
ises of the plaintiff; also that if plaintiff suffered auy 
damages it was the result of the plaintiff's contributory 
negligence that was a proxiinate cause of the dan1age, 
if any, sustained by him. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Case was tried by the court sitting without a jury, 
and the court concluded that sufficient evidence had 
not been presented by the plaintiff, on which the court 
could predicate a finding concerning the alleged un-
fitness of Applejack to breed at the time of sale, and 
as a result thereof dismissed plaintiff's complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, on this appeal, seeks to sustain the 
judgment in the lower court. 
STATEl\'IENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Robert L. Poulsen, is a doctor 
of veterinary science and resides in Tremonton, Utah. 
He met the plaintiff for the first time on the highway 
south of Pocatello, Idaho (Rec. 10, 188, 210}. Prior 
to said meeting and on the same day, Mr. and Mrs. 
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J•:rickson, with a party by the nan1e of Jack ~lerenes, 
hnd been to the premises of Dr. Poulsen in his absence 
and had seen the stallion Applejack. They had even 
lend hi1n out of his box-stall and examined him quite 
carefully (Rec. 9, 186, 197). When they 1net Dr. Poul-
sen on the road south of Pocatello, they asked him if 
the horse was for sale. He advised them that he was and 
that the asking price was $I500.00. They were there 
about I.> to 20 minutes and Erickson said if he could 
raise the money he would let him know (Rec. 2IO). 
Dr. Poulsen ( Rec. 2IO) testified that he did not recall 
anything said aboll:t what Mr. Erickson was going to 
do with the stallion, but just that he was interested in 
a P.O.A. stallion and he assumed he was buying him 
t'or a stallion, because he didn't say. 
The following Monday morning (Rec. 2II) Mr. 
~Ierenes called Dr. Poulsen and it was agreed that 
:\lerenes and ~Ir. Erickson would leave from Idaho 
Falls and driYe toward Tremonton and Dr. Poulsen 
would load the stud at Tremonton, and drive toward 
Idaho Falls and they would exchange the horse where 
they met. They met at 1\!IcCammon, Idaho. (Rec. 2II). 
~Ir. Erickson had a Chevrolet truck with a horse van 
on it. Dr. Poulsen had a Miley six pony trailer and 
the young stallion in the trailer. The record is conflict-
ing as to just what was said at the time the stallion 
was paid for and placed in the possession of the plain-
tiff, )lr. Erickson claiming (Rec. II): 
··A.. I asked hin1 again about his useability, and 
he assured n1e again that if I didn't use him 
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over two or three times a week, he'd be all 
allright, and that he'd had his shots for dis-
temper.'' 
Mr. Merenes (Rec. 190) said what happened was as 
follows: 
"A. Well, he asked him, he said, "How many 
mares are you going to breed with him?" 
And he said, "about thirty." Well, the doc-
tor says, "Do you realize the pony won't be 
two until this fall? He's a young pony ... " 
and reported that Erickson said: 
"A. Well, he said he'd take good care of him, 
breed what he could and he had a Shetland 
pony to help fill out what he wouldn't 
breed." 
He was asked if anything was said about the frequency 
of breeding and Mr. Merenes said: "I didn't hear any-
thing like that." He said he was there all the time. Dr. 
Poulsen (Rec. 212) gave his version of the conversation 
and said: 
" . . . I'm not certain of the exact words, but 
he said about this time, "Well, this little horse 
has sure got his work cut out for him. I've got 
thirty mares to breed to him." And I immedi-
ately says, "Well, you can't breed thirty mares 
to this horse. He won't be two until in the fall." 
MR. GEORGE D. PRESTON: Won't be 
what? 
A. Two until fall. And he said, "Oh, I'll be 
careful. I'll space them out and feed him and 
take good care of hi1n." And I says, "'Veil, you 
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want to retnetnber he's just a colt, just a young 
colt. I have bred two Inares to him and apparent-
ly they've settled." And I says, "I know that 
the horse has got a lot of breeding ability right 
now, because he tnade a good cover on these 
mares," and I said, "I'd be awful careful breed-
ing him to that tnany mares." 
He was asked if there was any conversation about 
breeding the horse twice a week and he said there was 
none. It was cold at the time and all three people 
were in the Poulsen pony trailer where they held their 
conversation for the purpose of getting out of the cold. 
The stallion was then transferred from the six pony 
trailer to the truck that Merenes and Mr. Erickson 
were in and driven to Idaho Falls (Rec. 191) and on 
'Yednesday he was taken to Montana (Rec. 12). It is 
'275 miles from Idaho Falls to the residence ef tli8 FQ~i 
~of the Ericksons in Montana (Rec. 22). Mrs. 
Erickson, however, (Rec. 51) said that they stayed 
at Archer, near Rexburg, Idaho, and stayed over night 
awl that .. Archer to Hamilton, where the Ericksons' 
residence is, is 250 miles and that the total distance 
ft·om Tremonton was 400 miles ( Rec. 40) . The stallion, 
while in the hands of Dr. Poulsen, had been bred to 
two different mares. One was a buckskin mare (Rec. 
'214) named Cheyenne. She had, from a previous breed-
ing, foaled on the 29th day of April, 1961. She was 
thereafter and within nine days bred to Applejack. 
)lr. Val Dee Leavit was present with Dr. Poulsen 
at the time of the breeding (Rec. 214, 173, 174). From 
this breeding the tnare had a colt in the following spring 
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(Rec. 174, 175) and this colt was examined by both 
Dr. Poulsen and Mr. Leavitt. They caught the colt 
and threw it down to determine its markings. It was 
found to be mottled under the tail and around the lips 
and had definite P.O.A. characteristics. The other 
mare (Rec. 215) was a little bay mare that Dr. Poulsen 
had bought at a Prescott sale in Idaho, and she was 
bred on the 12th day of May near the end of her heat 
period. The mare was taken to the Pamona Horse sale 
in California and sold on the 17th day of June. Prior 
to her sale she was moved into a barn (Rec. 217) and 
there she was clipped and put on a full grain ration. She 
was watched carefully to determine whether or not she 
had settled. She was cross tied in front of other stallions 
in box stalls and she did not come in heat. There was 
sufficient time elapsed between the breeding and the 
day of sale, so that she would have come in heat if she 
had not been settled. Mares vary from 18 to 21 days 
(R. 218) between their heat periods. The whereabouts 
of this mare became unknown so that the defendant 
could not deter1nine whether or not she had a P.O.A. 
colt. 
Up to the time of delivery in McCammon, Idaho, 
on the 29th day of l\1ay, the horse had proved his breed-
ing ability by breeding two mares. He was exception-
ally young, being approximately 21 1nonths of age, 
and would not reach his second year birthday until Sep-
tember 10, 1959. (Ex. 2). It had had the best of care 
and was kept in a separate box-stall. where the Erick-
sons had taken him out to look at hin1. (Rec. 187). 
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\\'hat the hors<.: was subjected to in the hands of 
the buyer can only be surmised by the history of what 
happened to the horse while in their hands. He first 
becnme atl'licted with ring-worn1 (Rec. -:t5), and Erick-
son also said : 
"A. \Veil, 1 noticed he wasn't as lively as other 
studs. l-Ie didn't run and buck and kick like 
he should have done. 
Q. \Vha t were his characteristics? 
A. l-Ie was a little stiff-legged, and that's the 
way he acted." ( Rec. 15) . 
In the month of October, 1961, (Rec. 16) he developed 
distemper. On Decen1ber 12, 1961, Mr. Erickson took 
hint to the veterinary and the veterinary discovered he 
was blind (Rec. 78); that he would stand with his head 
down like an ani1nal suggesting some form of brain 
damage; the horse died that day or the day following 
and a post-morte1n examination was made (Rec. 79) 
and they found absces~es within the brain which Dr. 
J a1nes K. Jackson from lVIontana (Rec. 79) called 
streptococci equi infection, as a result of the distemper. 
In regard to the use 1nade of this stallion, there 
was considerable question of whether abuse had taken 
place there. The total trip was 400 miles in length from 
Tremonton ( Rec. 40) . The stallion was unloaded and 
reloaded frmn one vehicle to another and kept over-
night. They put hun on a breeding program the day 
after he arrived ( Rec. 13) . They claimed he completely 
wilted durii1g an act of breeding ( Rec. 13, 14) and had 
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to be helped down and said they had never seen any-
thing like that. Yet four veterinary doctors, being the 
plaintiff's veterinary from Montana and two veterinary 
doctors called in by the defendant as well as the de-
fendant himself, said that this was very normal in a 
young stallion. This young stallion was bred six times 
in three weeks (Rec. 14) and none of the mares became 
with foal. On the 26th day of June ( Rec. 68) Dr. 
James W. Jackson was called in to make an examina-
tion and while there bred him to two different mares, 
one by use of a comdomn ( Rec. 70) and one without 
within a half hour interval. He clailned that the quantity 
of ejaculate was small and in response to his counsel's 
question ( Rec. 71) : 
"Q. Was the stallion Applejack capable of pro-
ducing offspring the day you made the test? 
A. On the basis of the test, no. But the fact that 
he was producing sperm could neither jus-
tify a diagnosis of infertility or fertility." 
He advised his client, the plaintiff, that you could not 
base a diagnosis or an interpretation on one test (Rec. 
73) . He prescribed rest and one tablespoon per day of 
Hi-Amine, an iodize protein (Rec. 74). He admitted 
it was a touchy drug ( Rec. 7 5) . He was given one 
tablespoon full per day of this drug from the 27th day 
of June to the 15th day of August (R. 31). The othel 
veterinarians all said the giving of the Hi-Amine drug 
for this period of time could, in their opinion, be very 
detrilnental to the horse's breeding ability (Rec. 126, 
10 
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t:.:7, 1.-Jti, 157 and :.!:.!;)) aw.ln1ight injure or destroy it, 
nud that they did not recmmnend it for a stallion. 
To give the stallion rest he was turned into a pas-
tun-. but il was found that this pasture contained two 
horse colts and two filly colts, all being yearlings (Rec. 
tiH) ... \11 of the veterinarians, both for plaintiff and 
defendant. admitted that filly colts of this age could 
come in heat and that there could be additional breeding 
that could be detritnental to this young stallion. (Rec. 
98, 1t>J. 228, 229). 
All of the veterinarians agreed that many factors 
nffect the production of sperm from day to day and 
two said that after the hauling of a young stallion for 
a distance of 400 miles under the conditions shown, 
that he should have had three weeks to a month rest 
before any breeding program (Rec. 91, 136, 137, 141, 
15:!, 153, 224). All of the veterinarians agreed that all 
tests and even the pathological report of the autopsy 
made, after death, showed that the horse was producing 
spertn and he could not be classed as sterile at any time 
(Rec. 90, 108, 121, 122, 155, 156, 220). The opinion 
testilnony of some of the veterinarians that the fact 
that the horse had been bred on the premises of the 
defendant and had produced a live foal was the best 
proof of his breeding ability and that he was fertile at 
the time of sale (Rec. 92, 131, 222). 
J.,ron1 this kind of evidence, the court had to find: 
"15. That while the court has found that 
Applejack was able to cover two mares and im-
11 
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pregnate one prior to the sale,and that after said 
animal was transported from Tremonton, Utah, 
to Hamilton, Montana, he was then unable to 
impregnate plaintiff's mares, this court is un-
able, from the evidence, to make any finding as 
to whether said animal was in fact infertile at the 
time of the sale." 
And had to conclude: 
"5. That sufficient evidence has not been pre-
sented by the plaintiff on which the court could 
predicate a finding concerning the alleged un-
fitness of Applejack to breed as of the time of 
sale." (Rec. 300). 
As a consequence, the court entered a judg1nent that 
plaintiff had no cause of acton against the defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NO. 5 AS FOUND 
IN THE AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DATED 16TH DAY OF JULY, 1963, Rec. 300). 
The plaintiff had the burden of proof and from 
that proof the court had to find and conclude, as set 
out in his conclusion of law No. 5, as follows: 
"5. That sufficient evidence has not been pre-
sented by the plaintiff on which the court could 
predicate a finding concerning the alleged un-
fitness of Applejack to breed as of the time of 
sale." 
12 
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The court. at that tin1c, iwll watched the \vitnesses, 
had had :111 opportunity to observe signalling, (Rec. 
it! and had had an opportunity to see the inconsisten-
cies of smne of the docu1nents that were handed in as 
exhibits. For instance, defendant's exhibit No. 26, 
which is a letter OYer the signature of plaintiff's expert 
witness J. 'V. Jackson, a \'eterinary of the Veterinary 
Clinic of Hun1ilton, ~fontana, dated January lOth, 
I 962. and addressed as follows: "'ro Whom It May 
Concern." The first paragraph of this exhibit says: 
"On J nne 26, 1961, I was called out to ex-
amine a P.O.A. Stud for Howard Erickson. He 
stated that 1nares repeatedly returned to estrus 
after breeding.'' (Italics added. ) 
Xow. this state1nent, when analyzed and when it is 
considered that it was made up after the stallion's 
death. leads one to believe that it was an attempt to 
obtain an advantage under a false premise. For in-
stanee, the heat period of estrus, as referred to by the 
doctor in his letter, is 18 to 21 days (Rec. 218), and they 
stay in this heat period for several days (Rec. 215). 
The plaintiff took the stallion to Idaho Falls over 
Decoration Day (Rec. 12) and left on Wednesday 
of said week and claims the first attempt to breed was 
the day after he got home (Rec. 13). This would put 
the first 1nare to be bred approxi1nately the first day 
of June. 'Y e have nothing in the record to show 
whether she was bred at the beginning of her heat period 
or at the end of it, but she would not come in heat 
again for 18 to 21 days after the end of the heat period. 
13 
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The next mare was bred the following Sunday and the 
same problem arises. The doctor, in his letter, says that 
the mares repeatedly returned to estrus, which would 
have to be more than once, which is physically impossible 
to happen. Then again, other exhibits were offered in 
with inconsistencies. Plaintiff's exhibits 4 to 10 inclu-
sive, being breeding certificates, show $50.00 paid for 
the service fee and the plaintiff claimed he paid the 
$350.00 for the seven breeding certificates (Rec. 19). 
Again exhibits II to I6 show a $50.00 breed fee each 
and plaintiff alleges he paid the said $50.00 each ( Rec. 
20) . On voir dire examination ( Rec. 22) he admitted 
he gave for the breeding certificates shown as Exhibits 
II to I6, two mares and a bridle. These two mares were 
sold shortly after, one being sold for $65.00 and the 
other for $72.50 (Rec. I95). The stallion Little Earth-
quake actually belonged to the defendant Dr. Poulsen, 
and he was taken there as a courtesty at the request of 
Dr. Poulsen by Mr. Merenes (Rec. I93) and the con-
sideration given being the two mares and a bridle was 
for th expense of the trip (Rec. I99) going and the 
picking of the stalleion again at a later date. In regard 
to the exhibits 4 to IO, it developed on cross-examina-
tion that there had been no money passed on that either 
(Rec. 34) but it was just a trade and that these cer-
tificates were obtained and 1nade up when they were 
getting ready to prepare for trial, and after the stal-
lion's death. 
Plaintiff, in his brief on page 4, quotes certain parts 
from different paragraphs out of the Findings and 
14 
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leaves other parts out lu suit his convenience, which 
creates a dili'erent itnpression than the actual findings 
if taken as a whole. :For instance, in paragraph 10, he 
leaves off the last phrase: 
" ... by reason of past perforinance." 
which ties back to Finding of Fact No. 2, which has 
1·eference to the breeding while in the hands of the 
defendant, having produced a live colt. Finding No. 
11 of the atnendments ties again back to paragraph 2. 
The amended ~.,inding No. 12, which was included at 
the instance of the plaintiff, speaks of representation, 
that is, representation of past performance, as spoken 
of in Findings No. 10 and 2, the know ledge and in-
tegrity spoken of would again refer to past perform-
ance, that is, that the horse had been bred to two mares 
and both 1nares appeared to be settled and it later 
proved that one gave birth to a live foal and the other 
was sold and lost track of, and it cannot be determined 
whether or not she gave birth to a live colt. The record 
is clear and the court so found that a foal was born 
from the breeding while in the hands of the defendant. 
The live foal is living proof of the fitness of the stallion 
while in the hands of the defendant and there is nothing 
in the record to show that this condition ever changed 
until the stallion got in the hands of the plaintiff, when 
it was so unwisely handled. Again, we find that the 
plaintiff in his brief, on page 4, leaves out a pertinent 
part in quoting from paragraph 13 from the findings 
to-wit: 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
" ... and that after said animal was trans-
ported from Tremonton, Utah, to Ha1nilton, 
Montana, he was then unable to impregnate 
plaintiff's mares, this court is unable, from the 
evidence, or to make any finding as to whether 
said ani1nal was in fact infertile at the time of 
sale." 
It must be re1nembered that each and all of the 
expert witnesses who testified, and there were four, 
claimed that all of the evidence showed the young stal-
lion, in each and all of the tests and the post-1nortem 
examination, revealed that he was, in fact, producing 
sperm in each and every occasion and that he could 
not be classed as sterile at any time. Each and all of the 
experts agree that the stress, strain, nervous excite1nent, 
over breeding, improper diet, transportation, sickness, 
infection and many other things either in the mare or 
the stallion, could affect the ability to have the mare 
become impregnated eYen with live sperm present. 
The Prestons, in their brief quote from the case 
of Eden vs. Vloed1nan, 1-i P2d 930. From an exami-
nation of this case it appears that bangs disease was 
reported in the cows. It also appears that the court ap-
parently was satified that the bangs disease was present 
at the time of sale, though not fully developed. This 
is contrary to any findings in our case. They also quote 
the case of Petersen vs. Dreher, 194 NW 53, which 
raised the question of whether an express warranty 
excluded any i1nplied warranty. In this action, the trial 
court granted defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict. When it was heard before the Supre1ne Court 
16 
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they held that the plaintiff had offered evidence that 
the sow was sterile at the time of sale and the court 
held that the case should have been submitted to a 
jury for breach of implied warranty, so that the jury 
might determine whether or not the defect existed at 
the time of sale. This case could not apply because the 
l'ourt. in our case, found that there was not sufficient 
evidence to warrant a finding that the defect did exist 
at the time of sale. 
They quote the case of Studebaker Bros vs. An-
derson, 50 Utah 319, 67 P. 663, involving an auto-
mobile which, to the writer of this brief, should not be 
applicable for two reasons. One, that anything that is 
alive and under the custody and control of man, has, 
its very existence, subject to the treatment that it re-
ceives from the hand of man from day to day. The other 
reason is that the whole reasoning of the court, in this 
case, indicated that the defect did apparently exist at 
the time of sale, which is contrary to the findings in 
our case. 
Their quotation from 46 Am. Jur., page 573, re-
fers to an exa1nination i1nmediately after sale, while 
the first examination that we had in this case was nearly 
a month later, by third parties. 
The l\Iousel vs. Widker case, 69 NW 2d 783, N.D., 
was a case where, in the trial in the District Court, the 
seller sued for the balance due on the purchase price. 
Judgment was rendered for seller. Thereafter, on mo-
tion. a new trial was granted and there was an appeal 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
from the order granting a new trial. The Supreme 
Court held that the instruction on express and i1nplied 
warranties and contracts were incomplete, misleading 
and amounted to misdirection, and that the court did 
not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. This 
was not a decision on its merits but upon the question of 
whether or not the jury had been properly instructed 
and the Supreme Court said it was the court's duty if 
there had been evidence of either express or implied 
warranty or both, to properly instruct upon it. The 
court had instructed on both theories. The court said, 
page 786, lefthand column: 
"In the instant case no request was made by 
the defendant for 1nore cmnplete instructions on 
implied warranty. Under the rule stated in the 
above cases he is barred from raising any objec-
tions to the insufficiency of the charge on im-
plied warranty. However, he is not barred on his 
motion for a new trial from claiming as error 
that the instructions the court gave on implied 
warranty amounted to misdirection. That he has 
a right to do even though he failed to ask for 
more complete instructions and is barred from 
objecting on the grounds of non-direction not 
amounting to misdirection.'' 
The motion for a new trial was sustained. 
In viewing the citations given by appellant in 53 
ALR 2d 884, it shows on any of the cases cited that are 
applicable that the implied warranty covered a defect 
that was in existence at tin1e of sale. \V e also have this 
sa1ne doctrine, that the defect must exist at the time of 
sale, found in 46 Am. J ur., page 571. 
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POINT II 
TI-lE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
:\lAKING CONCLUSION O.F' LAW NO.4, AND 
TilE JUDGMENT. 
The Findings of F., act taken collectively show ( Rec. 
288, 289, 299, and 300) : The purchase; sale for breed-
ing in keeping with age of 21 months; representing 
breeding to two mares and a live foal being born; in 
hands ot' plaintiff, breeding by plaintiff, but no foal; 
diseuse on plaintiff's premises; tests showing live and 
dead sperm; death from abscesses caused by distemper 
on plaintiff's premises; post-mortem showing at death 
production of active spermatozoa; no attempt to rescind 
sale prior to death of stallion; many factors relating to 
either mare or stallion such as age, physical condition 
of one or both contribute to failure of mares to get 
with foal; stallion represented fit and capable by reason 
of past perforznance; defendant kne'¥ stallion pur-
chased for breeding and plaintiff relief on representa-
tions of defendant, but after transportation was in-
capable of begetting offspring; some expenses incurred 
by plaintiff in veterinary and feeding; prior to sale bred 
twice, proof of one impregnation, but after transpor-
tation, unable to impregnate; that the court is unable 
from evidence to find animal infertile at time of sale. 
From these findings ( Rec. 290) the conclusion No. 
4, which is as follows: 
"4. That plaintiff has no cause of action against 
defendant." 
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and also conclusion No. 5 ( Rec. 300) : 
"5. That sufficient evidence has not been pre-
sented by the plaintiff on which the court could 
predicate a finding concering the alleged un-
fitness of Applejack to breed as of the time of 
sale." 
The Judgment (Rec. 291) merely carried these Find-
ings and Conclusions into effect. lVe believe that the 
Findings and Conclusions as well as the J udg1nent are 
proper and are in keeping with the law and adjudicated 
cases. 
Appellant states that he pleads for damages (Rec. 
263) but prays for two remedies (Rec. 264)-judg-
ment for damages in one paragraph - rescission and 
damages in another pargaraph and equitable relief in 
a third paragraph, and complains because defendant 
did not demand an election of remedies. It must be 
remembered at the tilne of the commencement of the 
action the stallion was dead and could not be returned 
to the seller so that the rescission as provided for in sub-
paragraph (d) of Section 60-5-7 U.C.A., could not 
apply. The appellant evidently recognized this for he 
set out in his proposed findings and conclusions ( Rec. 
296) paragraph 9: 
" ... at no tin1e prior to the death of said stal-
lion on the 13th day of Decembe1·, 1961, or prior 
to the 14th day of December, 1962, tl;le date when 
the said complaint was filed, did the plaintifl 
attempt to rescind said sale or return the stallion 
in the condition it was at the time of sale." 
And in his proposed conclusions ( Rec. 297) he says: 
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"4. Thnt plaintiff has suffered damages in the 
amount of' $1,450 by reason of' the breach of 
warranty and has elected to sue for breach of 
warranty and the difference between the amount 
paid for the stallion and its actual value. 
5. That plaintiff cannot rescind the contract 
of sale because of his delay in attempting rescis-
sion and further that plaintiff cannot return the 
stallion in substantially the same condition as it 
was when received." 
The plaintiff has prayed for damages. Under the 
statute he cannot rescind because he cannot return the 
subject matter of the sale. The defendant defended 
and said the animal, when delivered, was as represented, 
andit' any change took place while in plaintiff's hands 
it was because of plaintiff's abuse and mishandling. 
Then if the court, after hearing all of the evidence, 
finds and concludes that sufficient evidence had not 
been presented by the plaintiff on which the court could 
predicate a finding concerning the alleged unfitness of 
Applejack to breed as of the time of sale, he then 
has no cause of action. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
)lAKING CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 3. 
This conclusion of Law No. 3 (Rec. 289) reads as 
follows: 
"3. That the death of Applejack was not 
caused in any way by reason of the claim of 
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Applejack's incapability to impregnate plain-
tiff's mares." 
Evidently the plaintiff has reference to conclusions of 
law No. 2, not 3, at least it appears so from his argu-
ment. Let us take the exact testimony of Mrs. Erick-
son (Rec. 54, line 14): 
"A. Well, I asked if it was Dr. Poulsen and 
he said yes. So I told him about the tests that 
were made on the horse and that. Then he asked 
us if we would wait a while and give the horse 
a chance to mature, since he was just a young 
horse, which we agreed to do." 
Dr. Poulsen's testimony on this (Rec. 218, line 21) : 
"A. She told me that the horse wasn't settling 
her mares and that they were real disap-
pointed in the horse, that he was not settling 
the mares. I again told her that he was quite 
young to be carrying on much of a breed-
ing program, and I asked her, as I remem-
ber I asked her how many she'd bred, and 
I don't recall the nu1nber. She told me she'd 
bred a few. I don't remember exactly how 
many. But I told her that maybe with time 
the horse would get a little more n1aturity, 
he'd probably breed. 
Q. Was there anything said at that time about 
wanting to bring hi1n back? 
A. No, sir." 
From the record of the conversation does it meet the 
requirements of Section 60-5-7 subparagraph (d) 
U.C.A., which reads as follows: 
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"60-5-7. Re1nedics for breach of warranty-
( 1) 'Vherc there is a breach of warranty by the 
seller. the buyer may, at his election; (a) Ac-
cept or keep the goods and set up against the 
seller the breach of warranty by way of recoup-
ment in diminution or extinction of the price; 
(b) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an 
action against the seller for damages for the 
breach of warranty; 
(c) Refuse to accept the goods, if the property 
therein has not passed, and maintain an action 
against the seller for damages for the breach of 
warranty; or, 
(d) Rescind the contract to sell or the sale, and 
refuse to receive the goods, or, if the goods have 
already been received, return them or offer to 
return the1n to the seller and recover the price 
or any part thereof which has been paid." 
There certainly was no stallion returned or offered 
to be returned, as provided in sub-paragraph (d) of 
paragraph 1 of Section 60-5-7, U.,C.A., so that sub-
paragraph 5 of Section 60-5-7, U.C.A., could not apply 
nor any of the reasoning set out by appellant. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS THE TRIER 
OF THE FACTS AND TRIAL COURT'S FIND-
IXGS OF FACT 'VILL NOT BE DISTURBED 
AS LOXG AS THEY ARE SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OR UNLESS 
THERE IS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN 
EVIDENCE. 
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The most recent case of Lowe vs. Rosenlof et al., 
12 Utah 2d 190, 364 P2d 418, on page 419, right column 
on Pacific Reporter, says: 
" ( 1) This court has stated on numerous occa-
sions that findings of fact made by the trial court 
will not be disturbed so long as they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the 
findings of the lower court must be affirmed un-
less there was no reasonable basis in the evidence 
on which the court could fairly and rationally 
have thought the requisite proof was met." 
The same doctrine is found in Child vs. Child, 8 Utah 2d 
261, 332 P2d 981, and in De Vas v. N able, 13 Utah 2d 
133, 369 P2d 290. 
CONCLUSION 
The young stallion, before sale or after, was never 
sterile. His breeding ability could increase or decrease 
from time to time, according to favorable or unfavor-
able handling. His untimely death brought about on 
account of disease, contracted on the premises of the 
plaintiff which caused abscesses in the brain, destroyed 
a very desirable animal. The evidence adduced by the 
four veterinarians showed how important care and 
handling can be in any breeding program, particularly 
of young animals. Also, it showed how the ability of a 
young, immature animal to breed can change or alter 
from tin1e to time, according to conditions he might 
be subjected to. 
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\ \' e believe the horse was abused and improperly 
bred without consideration of his age. We believe the 
plaintiff gave no consideration to the effect of the haul-
ing. the weather, the infection contracted on plaintiff's 
premises, his stiff-leggedness, that developed at plain-
tiff's place indicating unknown conditions that he might 
have been subjected to. We do not believe he should 
have been turned into pastures with fillies that might 
come in heat and cause excessive breeding and stress, 
or tim t he should have been fed a touchy drug for pro-
longed periods of time. We do not believe that the de-
fendant must guarantee against such treatment. When 
we consider this kind of treatment with the fact that 
the stallion in the hands of the defendant bred two 
mares and evidently settled both, but absolute proof 
of impregnation of one was made, then we would have 
to conclude that at the time of delivery he was as rep-
resented. We believe that the court was correct in find-
ing and granting a judgment of no cause of action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Walter G. Mann 
Reed W. Hadfield, of the firm of 
Mann and Hadfield 
Brigham City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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